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This thesis strives towards a moral conception of allyship rooted in respect in order to 
address rising critiques that regard allyship as a morally bankrupt and ineffective practice. The 
thesis proceeds by first examining the pragmatic institutional understanding of allyship and how 
such an understanding justifies the critiques of re-centering that are raised against allyship. In an 
effort to address these concerns, this thesis raises concerns about the roles of beneficence and 
love in allyship and proposes an understanding of allyship rooted in respect where that respect is 
best understood as respecting the right to self-determination of oppressed communities.   
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The soul of America sits at a crossroads, now more than ever. Indeed, America’s history 
is wrought by its original sins that should invoke the deepest horror possible, and looking back it 
seems that surely we are better now than we were then. But, the simple truth is that we are not. 
Perhaps, we are even worse because we have seen the light and chosen otherwise. Often it felt 
that for every step forward oppressed communities take they are knocked back two, and now, 
with the brazen reinvigoration of racists, sexists, homophobes, ablest, and even neo-Nazis, those 
most vulnerable have been knocked back miles. In some ways it is almost unfathomable to think 
that we seem to have made so much progress for the moral good, and, yet, so many people, 
misled by fear, could abandon our march towards the moral good when we ought to have 
doubled down. Those of us in places of privilege must recognize that lives do hang in the balance 
and that we must do everything in our power to continue our march towards the moral good. For 
this reason, it is essential to understand how we may work to bring about the moral good by 
working with oppressed people and communities to restructure oppressive systems. One way to 
do this is through allyship. It is this possible moral foundation of allyship that is the concern of 
this thesis.    
This thesis will take allyship to be a collective attitude that motivates individuals of 
dominant social communities to act on behalf of oppressed communities to overturn oppressive 
systems that have harmed those groups and bestowed unearned privileges on dominant social 
communities.1 Attitudes are dispositions, opinions, ways of thinking that become manifest in our 
actions. Acting as an ally stems from internal beliefs about others outward in the hopes of 
achieving some end. The white northerner who joined the freedom rides in hopes of challenging 
Jim Crow laws was moved to action by his attitudes, his moral evaluations of the situation. 
Similarly, the friendly co-worker who speaks with management at a restaurant regarding its poor 
layout for those with mobility impairments is moved equally by her moral attitudes regarding her 
co-worker’s best interest. Allyship proper, as an attitude, is rooted in a collection of values and 
                                                        
1 I modeled this definition after one developed by E.M. Broido in “The development of social 
justices allies during college: a phenomenological investigation” (2000). This is an elementary 
definition of allyship that washes over some of the dimensional complexities of allyship, but this 
definition is one that is often deployed in real world institutions (like universities). For the sake 
of this paper, I will be using this kind of definition because it is a commonly understood and 
accessed definition of allyship.  
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dispositions. It is through a careful examination of these constitutive values that a wholesome 
picture of allyship may be garnered.  
Many theorists, who are seeking a more powerful, collective social justice movement, 
have turned their attention to evaluating allyship. The actual practice of allyship has fallen short, 
and some have emphasized a need to move away from the allyship model because they believe it 
to be beyond correction. One of the most central critiques levied against allyship is that allies fail 
to decentralize their dominant culture. This phenomenon can present in many different ways, but 
it is commonly united by the fact that an ally attempts to lead the movement by advocating for 
those who are oppressed to take on the roles and expectations of the majority.  
When faced with these objections, one cannot help but think that allyship needs to either 
be abandoned in pursuit of a more effective framework or that it needs to be radically 
reformulated. It seems clear, though, that allyship is, at least in part, justified by its concern for 
others. Allyship, as a model of social activism, has come under fire from many individuals who 
see it as failing to fulfill its goals and has become a sort of self-serving practice.  I will, broadly, 
attempt to show that one of the moral attitudes that might motivate allyship can make it a valid 
form of social activism and largely immune to the criticisms that are levied against the practice.  
Ultimately, I believe that with a more precise understanding of proper allyship, it can be 
reclaimed and implemented at a time when it is of the utmost importance to be effective in 
fighting against authoritarian oppression on local, state, and national levels.   
In chapter one, I will begin by looking at some of the prominent work on the allyship 
model. I hope to clarify what allyship is most often taken to be in the literature. From that, I will 
present some possible moral attitudes that plausibly motivate allyship. In chapter two I will set 
out to explain in more detail a facet of the critique on ally re-centering. After clarifying what the 
critique I am focusing on means, I will expound on how that critique affects the moral efficacy of 
allyship. Chapter three will constitute the bulk of my argument; I will first be attempting to 
explain why allyship rooted centrally in beneficence or love would be problematic and how these 
attitudes would fail to address the critique raised in chapter two. I ultimately present an argument 
that respect, specifically negative respect, is the necessary moral foundation for allyship in 
moving forward and addressing the issue of re-centering. In the last chapter, I attempt to sketch a 
more concise picture of allyship rooted in negative respect and then take up possible concerns 
that may arise in conceptualizing allyship in such a way.  
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The ultimate goal of this project is to bring light to issues in allyship. If we are to 
continue marching towards moral good, then those of us who benefit from these systems and 
who are alienated from its oppressive effects must know how to relate ourselves to oppressed 
communities effectively. Just as importantly, we must learn how we can assist in dismantling 





CHAPTER 1: What is Allyship 
 
Introduction 
 In late June 1964 three men, Michael Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, 
went to Philadelphia, Mississippi to register black voters. Working with the Congress of Racial 
Equality (CORE), the men were seeking to assist the oppressed Blacks in the south access the 
ballot box. By working to register voters, these activists were seeking to improve the systemic 
oppression that people of color experienced in the post-reconstruction south. On August 4 the 
FBI unearthed the bodies of these three men. During the investigation, the FBI had also found 
the bodies of eight other black men, two of whom were also confirmed to have been working 
with CORE.2 These men working for CORE exhibited the attitude of an ally in seeking to 
empower oppressed communities to strike at the heart of the oppressive system that created the 
inequality.  
 There are ready-to-mind countless examples of allies who have worked both on 
individual levels and larger, more systemic levels to address the inequality that many 
communities face. From those who advocated for access to fair pay to those who marched in the 
streets following stonewall even to those who traveled to North Dakota to help protest against 
the government-sanctioned encroachment of private companies on native lands. Social Justice 
activism is not a novel phenomenon; however, the institutionalization, study, and theorizing of 
what constitutes allyship is. The social sciences are researching the characteristics of allies and 
what traits are most relevant in training someone to be an ally. As these social scientists have 
codified the necessary attributes of allyship, they have deployed policies and initiatives that seek 
to train allies throughout various organizational entities.   
 Allyship is a vast attitude that is constituted by internal dispositions and external 
practices that covers numerous relationships between ever-shifting groups of people. As such it 
is necessary to begin looking at some of the prevalent understanding of allyship in order to get a 
starting point. From that starting point we can examine what possible moral attitudes run through 
                                                        
2 Public Broadcasting Station Freedom Summer Article, “Murder in Mississippi,” Public 
Broadcasting Station, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/freedomsummer-
murder/ (accessed May 1, 2018).  
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the existing frameworks as well as allow us a way to begin examining where these frameworks 
fall short.  
According to the widely cited article on Social Justice Allyship by E.M. Broido (2000) 
allies are defined as, “members of dominant social groups who are working to end the system of 
oppression that gives them greater privilege and power based on their social-group 
membership.”3 Broido’s definition of allyship is an example of allyship definitions often given 
within institutional settings such as schools and universities. Broido’s definition is a very typical 
definition of allyship, but it seems to conflict with the understanding of allyship as being this 
complex phenomenon of attitudes and practices. Keith Edward’s sees this and takes Broido’s 
definition as a starting point but then develops a systemic framework that begins to explore the 
different stages allies go through in developing practices and attitudes. Using this model as a 
jumping board, I will then to show how specific moral attitudes underlie each stage of ally 
development.  
 
Identity Development Model 
Keith Edwards article “Aspiring Social Justice Ally Identity Development: A Conceptual 
Model,” published in NASPA Journal in 2006, has become a staple in ally training initiatives, 
especially in higher education and captures the general pragmatic essence of writing about 
allyship.4 In this article, Edwards is attempting to conceptualize the different ways someone 
develops an ally identity. For Edwards, allyship is an identity, what someone is, and not an 
attitude that one possesses. His bases for claiming that allyship is an identity is that it holds many 
of the same properties associated with leadership, which is generally taken to be an identity 
feature. Edwards, in fact, draws analogies between the development of leadership identities and 
the development of social justice ally identities. In doing so he conceptualizes an allyship 
development framework that is divided into three distinct stages. Edwards does advocate for an 
identity conception of allyship whereas I am advocating for an attitudinal approach. However, 
Edwards’ overall theoretical framework can be highly informative in helping to delineate the 
                                                        
3 Ellen M. Broido, “the Development of Social Justice Allies During College: A 
Phenomenological Investigation,” Journal of College Student Development 41, no. 1 (2000): 3. 
4 Edwards currently runs a massive educational program that centers on social activism, 
including activism against sexual assault and toxic masculinity. He tours the country giving 
speeches and holding workshops on developing social justice allies. 
 
 6 
stages one might develop an attitude of allyship. One’s attitudes often play a fundamental role in 
their identity development, maintenance, and revision. In thinking of the connection between 
attitudes and identity in this way, it seems clear to say that Edwards’ identity model would be 
underpinned by attitudes of various sorts, including moral attitudes. While Edwards himself 
takes an amoral approach to writing about allyship, much of the research that is the bases of 
Edwards framework assumes that certain preexisting moral values are necessary for the creation 
and development of an ally identity.5  
Edwards divides the ally developmental process into three stages. Each stage is 
characterized by a group of assumptions and dispositions held by the ally regarding the ally 
themselves, those they are seeking to advocate on behalf of, and the system of oppression as a 
whole. These stages are not meant to be linear or self-contained, i.e., Edwards states that often an 
ally may move fluidly between the stages depending on environment and is situationally 
contextual. Edwards is also clear to state that most allies probably have blended motivations thus 
blurring the distinctions between stages.  
Aspiring ally for self-interest is the first stage in Edwards’ Aspiring Ally Identity Model. 
This stage is characterized most by the ally’s focus on themselves. Allies at this stage are only 
concerned for those they care about. This kind of allyship is very common in movements like 
gender equality. For example, We can think of cases of fathers who may not have been allies 
against sexism, and who may have even perpetuated sexism, but who are worried about their 
daughters not being hired if they do not “look pretty,” as being in this first stage.6 Ideally the 
father begins to become aware of the effects of the system on his daughter even though he may 
miss the larger systems at work as well as the fact that other women are subject to the same sort 
of oppressive schemas.  
Allies in this stage are characteristically not concerned about individuals beyond those 
who they have deep relational connections with, nor do they believe that the troubles their loved 
ones’ encounter are the product of an oppressive system, but rather the product of some 
individuals acting in a bad way. This beginning stage of an allyship is the most easily taken on 
because we often are already in some sort of advocate type orientation with our close relations 
                                                        
5 This research includes work by Broido (2000), Fabiano, Perkins, Berkowits, Linkenbach, and 
Stark (2003), and Goodman (2000).  
6 This example comes from Edwards, p. 46.  
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outside of typical social justice ally work. This can most easily be seen in the case of a parent 
and a child. Parents often seek, especially in younger, formative years, to be a sort of cheerleader 
for their child; they are constantly working to support their child and create an environment that 
will best help their child to develop. This kind of caring relationship is constitutive of most of 
our close relations. We want to see those we care most about flourish in every possible way 
available to them.  
Given then this general understanding of our closest relations, we can see how the first, 
and easiest, allyship attitude to take on would be allyship from self-interest. Again, it is 
important to state that allies at this stage do engage in limited ally work but not for the work 
itself or some large concern for a community of people, but rather for a specific person that the 
ally cares about. Of course, there very well may be other attitudes that motivate this stage of 
allyship, but the most prominent attitude appears to be love. Take for example the father of a 
Trans daughter who wants to be able to use the correct bathroom. Her father writes the principle 
to try and work out a plan for his daughter. The father is not advocating for a large-scale change 
in the school or the school board’s policies. He is acting as an ally on behalf of his daughter for 
her needs because he loves her. He is not trying to advocate for all Trans students nor is he trying 
to advocate for Trans issues themselves; he is simply trying to help his daughter.  
The father is advocating for his daughter because he loves her and wants her world to be 
the best it can be for her. His motives stem from the relationship and feelings of love that he has 
for his daughter because she is his daughter. It seems unclear whether or not the father could be 
moved to advocate for someone he does not have the same connection with nor is it the case that 
he sees a larger problem in the system itself that is putting his daughter’s happiness in jeopardy 
in the first place.   
The second stage of Edwards’ model, aspiring ally for altruism, is significantly different 
from aspiring ally for self-interest in many ways. First and foremost, allies in this stage are 
beginning to develop understandings of their unearned privilege. They see that whole groups 
rather than just specific persons face oppression. It is this maturing understanding of systemic 
oppression and privilege that motivates these allies. However, allies in this stage often feel a 
sense of shame for their privilege and so seek to correct that by helping those who are oppressed. 
Allies in this stage believe that oppressed peoples need their help to change the system. These 
allies are most likely to take on the idea of being a savior to the oppressed. The allies attempt to 
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help, but often fail because they are focused on other members of the privileged population as 
the sole perpetrators rather than the system as a whole. Allies from altruism appear to have the 
beginnings of what an ally should be. They are motivated by a concern for people who face 
oppression. However, the paternalistic nature of the stage seems to emphasize an attitude that 
seeks to help oppressed communities out of a sense of charity. 
It is possible to begin developing an understanding of others disadvantages within the 
society without truly understanding their own privilege. For example, we can imagine a work 
colleague speaking on behalf of her co-work at a restaurant that is not well suited for individuals 
with mobility impairments. The colleague may be aware that individuals with certain handicaps 
are at a disadvantage in certain places but may not understand her own privilege for being able-
bodied. Another example, though, of an ally from altruism where the ally begins to understand 
their own privilege might be a teacher who is aware of his own privilege in studying a 
predominantly white canon attempts to incorporates works by People of Color specifically to 
help make his class more comfortable for Students of Color.  
Both of these example allies are acting out of some concern for the recipients of their acts 
similar to allies from self-interest, however these example allies are concerned with the 
oppression that other people face regardless of the relation between the ally and the person 
receiving their help. The colleague and the teacher both hope to make life a little easier for those 
they encounter by doing small deeds for them. Allies in this stage see themselves as being in a 
position to help those in need. Our colleague sees her co-worker struggling to get through a 
restaurant, and the teacher believes his students of color are affected by not seeing their 
perspectives reflected in the work the class is reading. It is this concern for another’s wellbeing 
and a drive to help those in need that suggest that an attitude of beneficence underrides the allies 
in this stage.  
Allyship from altruism is different from the first stage and the attitude of love that I claim 
motivates it because the allies in this stage need not have a close relation to those they help, for 
example, an ally talking to a bystander who is being harassed for her hijab in order to discourage 
the harassers as well as encourage and support the bystander.  
The final stage in Edwards model is the ally from social justice. Two main features 
characterize allies in this stage. The first is that allies in this stage do not seek specifically to help 
the oppressed out of beneficence or love, but they are motivated by respect for those who are 
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oppressed. This is a major contrast between both the ally from self-interest and the ally from 
altruism. The first two stages of allyship see ally work as helping those who cannot in some way 
help themselves through acts of love or charity, while allies from social justice believe that those 
they seek to work with are equally equipped to advocate on their own behalf.  
The other different characteristic of the ally from social justice is that these allies are, to a 
greater extent, allies to causes rather than to particular people. These allies see their goals and 
work as addressing specific, systemic problems that do in fact have positive effects on people 
who are oppressed. Overall, allies’ actions are concerned with people but targeted at larger 
systemic functions and not solely on oppressed individuals. One such example of this final stage 
of allyship might be a young man who works with a local National Origination for Woman 
chapter to address local to national issues such as paid maternity leave, equal pay, and healthcare 
access. He is not solely advocating just on behalf of someone close to him that he loves nor is he 
simply helping individuals that he sees are in need, but rather seeking to correct a larger system 
that failed to take proper account of others’ worth. In this way, the young man has an attitude of 
proper respect for the dignity of persons and sees injustices as an affront to that very dignity, and 
so works to correct the system.  
 
Conclusion 
Social justice allyship is a vast phenomenon of attitudes and practices held by an array of 
people in an even wider, diverse sets of relations to each other. Keith Edward’s model makes 
great headway into understanding the characteristics of different kinds of allies in their 
development in ways that the Broido definition and others like it have not quiet done. Edwards 
lays out a very convincing and well received framework that has been employed by a large range 
of institutions for training. However, it is this kind of generic framework of allyship that has 
come under scrutiny in recent years as failing to be robust and effective enough in creating and 
sustaining social justice change. Most importantly is that such a model cannot place the 
necessary value on allies decentering themselves from these movements and work in solidarity 
with those who are oppressed.  
 So, in hope of finding morally justifiable grounds for maintaining an allyship model, we 
have spent this chapter clarifying the characteristics of different allies in different stages of the 
model. Each stage’s characteristics can be understood as being motivated by possible moral 
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attitudes. The first stage, ally from self-interest, are allies who are motivated to help and 
advocate on behalf of those closest to them. These allies are most likely moved by their attitudes 
of love for those they are helping. The allies in the second stage, ally from altruism, are not as 
concerned with having close relationships with those they help. These allies seem to be 
motivated to help and offer charitable assistance to those they see in need. These allies seem to 
most likely be motivated by beneficence. The last stage of ally, ally from social justice, are often 
motivated by a sense of respect and see injustice as an affront to the dignity off all persons.  




CHAPTER 2: Critiques of Allyship 
 
Introduction 
While Edwards’ model on the development of social justice allyship is effective in laying 
a plausible and widely accepted foundation for the practice of allyship, it too is subject to the 
critiques brought against the idea and practice of allyship. The most troubling, damning, and 
recurrent critique in the literature draws attention to an ally’s inability to decentralize their own 
dominant culture. In essence, allies, while attempting to dismantle these systems of oppression 
are, in fact, reinforcing them through various mechanisms. In this chapter, I will first survey one 
of the main critiques raise in the allyship literature. From there I will attempt to show that these 
objections raised against allyship are valid and have deeper philosophical interest, relating 
specifically to the development of one’s identity as an actor in their own life under oppression as 
well as the idea of proper respect between persons.  
 
Allyship and Re-centering  
The most troubling critique that has been raised about allyship is that allies fail to 
properly relate themselves in their allyship towards oppressed communities. Often this improper 
relation is expressed in allies’ actions such as ally theater or ally paternalism. These critiques 
draw attention to the root of these issues; specifically, that allies of a dominant community while 
attempting to change the existing power structures actually reinforce the existing oppressive 
power relations by failing to de-center themselves.  
One explication of this problem is found in Lori D. Patton and Stephanie Bondi’s paper 
“Nice White Men or Social Justice Allies?...” Patton and Bondi, focus on anti-racism allyship, 
and discuss how often white allyship is only productive when it aligns with the interest of whites. 
It is also often the case, they claim, that white allies take on the “white savior” attitude in their 
ally work; they often attempt to lead anti-racism movements and to dictate what issue need to be 
addressed and how to do so, e.g. “we [People of Color in protest] cannot destroy property or stop 
traffic.” This recentralizing of the dominant population, whiteness for Patton and Bondi, stems 
from the allies focus on themselves rather than focusing on those they are attempting to help; 
focusing on relieving their white guilt instead of the need to dismantle white supremacy for the 
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sake of those who have suffered and died, either directly or indirectly, under the fist of white 
supremacy.  
 Anti-racist allyship is often motivated, at least in the beginning, by feelings of guilt that 
white allies experience when becoming aware of the systemic oppression that exists and 
continues to be reshaped in modern society in institutions from the prison industrial complex to 
the use of color-blind language used in policies and law. However, other forms of allyship, such 
as Queer allyship or disability allyship, lack the same sort of negative motivation towards 
allyship that anti-racism does. Often people who come to allyship around queer, disabled, or 
even female populations are motivated by personal relationships to individuals within these 
communities. There are many examples of how relationships can play a role in someone 
becoming an ally from the parent who becomes an active member of PFLAG because their 
daughter comes out a queer to the brother who takes up advocacy for neural diversity because his 
sibling has Downs Syndrome. Does allyship that is motivated in other ways, targeting other 
populations, still find itself the proper subject of these critiques raised against anti-racist “allies?” 
Matthew Grzanka, Jake Adler, and Jennifer Blazer in their research on empirical 
characteristics of Queer activism discuss the difference in motivation to allyship amongst queer 
allies and allies for anti-racism movements.7 Often, they claim, the main antecedent to anti-
racism allyship is white guilt or emotional response to the perceived plight of people of color. 
Research has shown that Queer allyship, however, is most often predicated on positive exposer 
to Queer individuals throughout childhood and into young adulthood.89 This relational feature of 
allyship for queer communities is not entirely unique. Similar relational motivators exist for 
disability allies as well. Perhaps too often people are motivated towards allyship aimed at 
dismantling ableism only once someone close to them is or becomes differently-abled.  
                                                        
7 I am choosing to use Queer in place of LGBTQIAA+, or any variation on the LGBT 
abbreviation, because the term Queer is powerfully broad. It allows for a collection of identities 
that are often forgotten, miss categorized, or even purposefully excluded from allyship for 
differing reasons. In addition, the positive reclamation of the word Queer to the community’s 
lexicon and use of the term merely helps to reinforce the autonomy and power of the community 
as well as its resilience in the face of oppression. 
8 See also Russel and Bohan 2016. 
9 While it is outside of the scope of this current project, I believe that a closer analysis of the 
differing predications of allyship between Queer allyship and Anti-racism allyship might have 
interesting conclusions in regards to the overall acceptance and success of these movements 
amongst the society at-large.  
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 While there are indeed differing catalysts for, say, Queer or ablest allies and Anti-Racism 
allies, it seems that the critique of allies recentralizing their own dominance continues to 
resurface. Grzanka, et al. discuss some of the ways that heteronormativity is often re-centered by 
allies in Queer allyship.10 This re-centering comes in the form of what Grzanka calls “neoliberal 
sexual politics.” Front-and-center in this neoliberal sexual politics within the Queer movement 
has been the focus on marriage equality. Uptake of and emphasis on the marriage equality issue 
amongst straight allies is rooted in the reinforcement of the capitalist constructed nuclear family. 
Allies preached that “love is love” and, so, should be treated the same, i.e. treated as straight 
love. However, this mantra that “love is love” has significant repressed assumptions that are in 
themselves worthy of reevaluation as well as blind spots to what exactly the queer movement is. 
The movement itself seems to say that as long as the relationship can mirror a typical 
heterosexual relationship then it is worthy of all the privileges that come with the heterosexual 
relationship. The queer movement, however, began with the goal to overturn the entire system of 
sexual privilege to begin with. 
 Unfortunately, this re-centering takes place across the board in allyship. In some 
disability scholarship and advocacy there is the idea that disability is a mishap in the lives of 
differently abled individuals. The medical model takes this idea to heart, that the goal of 
disability allyship has to work on changing differently abled people so that they conform with 
this dominant cultural ideal of functioning. Organizations like Autism Speaks epitomize this 
push by allies to define and control the conversation and the solution.   
 Re-centering is seen in gender equality movements as well. It occurs when the male ally 
“mansplains” feminism or the role of oppression on the lives of women to the silencing of 
women infinitely more qualified and deserving of the space to speak than he is. Recentering 
occurs when the experiences of Black or Latina or Latinx or other Women of Color are equated 
unequivocally to the experience of white women, thus erasing the intersecting nature of 
oppression. 
The phenomenon of allies, who are entrenched in their own dominant culture, to re-
center, to prioritize, that dominant culture within the space of ally work seems to occur in ways 
                                                        
10 Patrick Grzanka, Jake Adler, and Jennifer Blazer, “Making Up Allies: The Identity 




that are unrelated to what populations they are seeking to assist want. Given that this issue in 
allyship occurs regardless of which oppressed populations the allies are working with, the 
critique raised strikes at an issue about allyship in general.  
 
Re-centering, Identity, and Autonomy 
Given that allies tend to re-center the dominant culture that they are supposed to be 
dismantling, it is worth discussing in a little more depth what the process of re-centering is and 
attempting to draw out why this re-centering might undermine the entire enterprise of allyship. 
While it is true that the refocusing of dominance by allies undermines any progress that allies can 
make, that is not what makes recentralizing problematic. Understanding the severity of re-
centering requires one to understand one of the most troubling features of oppression on people. 
Oppression fundamentally molds the identities that come to exist under it.  
This fact has come into focus within the past couple of years with discussions such as 
Rachel Dolezal’s claim to be transracial. Dolezal believes, to whatever actual extent, that she is 
actually a Black woman even though she is the white daughter of two white parents. Dolezal’s 
exploits, book, and Netflix documentary have brought the idea of Transracialism into discussion 
across a swath of professions and mediums. I reference this story to draw attention to a response 
written by Denene Milner for NPR in which Milner discusses Dolezal and her claims to 
transracialism.11 Milner, in response to the idea of transracialism, draws directly on the feature of 
oppression that makes recentralizing most problematic, namely the phenomenon that oppression 
molds existence. Milner uses a beautifully constructed metaphor in which she sates: “…like 
diamonds, blackness is created under extreme pressure and high temperature, deep down in the 
recesses of one's core.” Milner is explicating the phenomenon of how oppression molds, perhaps 
even creates, one’s identity. This phenomenon is also discussed by Tommie Shelby.  
Shelby in We Who Are Dark puts forward a theory of how the African Diaspora in the 
United States can come to develop a collective identity without relying on a race essentialist 
narrative. One such feature that Shelby posits as developing this collective identity is the shared 
                                                        





effects of oppression perpetrated against Black Americans.12  Franz Fanon’s chapter entitled, 
“Negro and Recognition” in his work Black Skin, White Mask seeks to explain this very 
phenomenon as it happened in the colonial Caribbean. Fanon, himself drawing from the 
Hegelian Dialectic, seeks, in part, to detail the ways in which living under oppression models 
one’s identity as a person and actor in the world. Fanon discusses the French slaves of the 
Caribbean and their emancipation in comparison to the American slave ultimately concluding 
that the French slaves continued to be the object of their oppressors even in their emancipation. 
The French slaves, while being free, were still the Other; they were being acted upon instead of 
acting while the American slaves had the opportunity to fight, to act, for their freedom.13 
While Fanon couches his discussion of this invasive molding of one’s identity in the 
language of Othering, or alterity, and such language has its baggage, it still conveys the overall 
effect that I am attempting to draw to the forefront. When a group of people are oppressed, they 
come to understand themselves and their identities as a relational matter to those who are 
oppressing them. The identity of the oppressed becomes the output of the dominator. The 
oppressed are acted upon instead of being able to actively act for themselves. Simply, they are 
the object not the subject of an action regarding their own lives within an oppressive schema.14   
Ultimately, allies often enough, either knowingly or unknowingly, fail to fully understand 
their power and privilege and in failing to do so reinforce that oppressive power structure with 
their allyship ultimately mitigating any progress that allies may be able to assist in making and 
ultimately undermining the purpose of allyship. So, when allies, who are supposed to be working 
to overhaul oppressive systems, instead continue to reinforce these oppressive systems by re-
                                                        
12 Tommie Shelby, “The Political Morality of the Black Solidarity,” in We Who Are Dark, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 244-246. 
13 Frantz Fanon, “The Negro and Recognition,” in Black Skin, White mask, (New York: Grove 
Press, 1967), 216-222. 
14 The effects of oppression on identity development may seem like a hard concept to generalize 
across different forms of oppression. It may very well be that the effects of racist or sexist 
oppression may have an earlier effect on identity development than other forms of oppression. 
However, I think that it is perfectly logical to argue for a general idea that oppression, in 
whatever form it takes, has some kind of effect on how one perceives themselves and their being 
in the world. For example, we can imagine someone who becomes paralyzed after an accident; 
their identity while change and part of that change will come from the effects of an ablest 
society. The idea of an oppressed minority seems to theoretically require both a statistical norm 
and a societal norm.    
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centering their own cultures those who are oppressed are still then being acted upon by the ally 
instead of being supported in their own self-determination free of undue coercion by oppression. 
This practice of re-centering is morally questionable because in treating oppressed people as 
something to be acted upon, no matter the intention, and failing to recognize the autonomy of 
these oppressed peoples have to be self-determining undermines the inherent value of the people 
that allies are seeking to work with. 
 
Conclusion 
One of the main goals of allyship is to work towards dismantling oppressive systems with 
the overall effect of creating a society in which everyone can live free from undue oppression. 
As I have attempted to emphasize in this chapter, many modern thinkers have turned a light of 
reflection on allyship. These theorists have explicated that allies when attempting to work on 
behalf of oppressed peoples often instead engage in re-centering the dominant culture, e.g., 
through advocating for oppressed people to fit into certain ideals in order to not be oppressed. 
We have explored why such a practice by allies is counter to the overall goal of allyship and that 
such practices are deeply troubling moral phenomena that need to be confronted and resolved. If 
allies fail to recognize that oppressed people are rational beings worthy of respect and capable of 
determining their own courses of action to fight their oppression, then such people are not allies 
and instead are merely creating another face for the oppressive systems that are already in place.  
Allyship, at its core, is a moral endeavor to create a world in which power is not unduly 
used to oppress people. It is the case that allyship is infected with a practice, re-centering, that is 
immoral and poisons the work that allies engage in. Many theorists who have brought forth 
evidence of this issue have not concluded though that allyship need to be wholly abandoned. 
Some hold that while this problem threatens the very core allyship, a reframing of allyship such 
that allies would become more accountable could possibly weed out this horrific practice.15 I 
believe that a moral conception of allyship is the answer to a new framework and provides a rich 
understanding of what the goal of allyship is as well as the accountability necessary to weed out 
the pervasive practice of re-centering. 
                                                        
15 For such proposals see S. Hunt and C. Holmes p. 162 as well as L. Patton and S. Bondi p. 509 
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In Chapter one, I explored the popular allyship model created by Keith Edwards and I 
attempted to explicate possible moral attitudes that might underlie allyship. If we are to take 
allyship to a moral endeavor, then we must better understand what about allyship’s moral 
attitudes are morally justifiable, specifically which of these possible moral attitudes of allyship 
can be the bases of this new conception. In the following chapter I will argue that in framing 
allyship as a moral endeavor we can turn to a discussion of respect so as to create a new effective 
conception that addresses the critiques raised against allyship. 
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CHAPTER 3: Allyship and Moral Attitudes 
 
Introduction 
 As Edwards’s model is laid out, we get a clear picture of the general, descriptive 
understanding of allyship. However, such a framework is miles from understanding about 
whether or not such a framework ought to be accepted or rejected. Obviously, as with most sorts 
of sociological models of this sort, it seeks to simply explain a series of human phenomena and 
actions. One may very well say that Edward’s model has done just that by describing a set of 
actions that humans preform under the guise of allyship. However, any work on allyship has set 
before itself as a goal the development and achievement of allyship in general, i.e., the 
dismantling of oppressive power structures and establishing in society the equal worth of all 
peoples. Therefore, we must ask further of Edwards’s model, and of allyship in general, if the 
practices and the attitudes that underlie them are achieving the goal of furthering the betterment 
of those who are oppressed.  
 As I discussed in Chapter two, many theorists have raised very powerful objections that 
allyship is actually detrimental to the goals of overturning oppressive systems, and that allyship 
must experience a revival or be abandoned. I posited that a moral conception of allyship may 
provide the necessary framework for allyship to be accountable and to address these critiques.  
 In chapter one I attempted to clarify some plausible moral attitudes that might constitute 
the differing stages of allyship in order to establish a clear starting point in evaluating the moral 
merits of allyship, if there are any. Again, we simply cannot stop by stating what attitudes might 
be motivating allyship, but we must go further in asking if these attitudes are a proper attitude to 
take for effective, just allyship, i.e. if these attitudes are morally justifiable.  
 Chapter three will start by examining the attitude of love that underlies allyship from self-
interest. I will then discuss the attitudes of beneficence and respect that motivate allyship from 
altruism and social justice respectively. With each attitude I will take a similar approach. I will 
begin by offering a brief and hopefully uncontentious account of the attitudes. After which I will 
begin working through different examples of allyship to draw out concerns about the attitudes 





Allyship and Love 
 Much has been written about the role of love in moral life. Yet, without a doubt, love is a 
foundational emotion of the human condition. Love is primitive. Love is in that initial connection 
between a mother and her newborn. However, even with that in mind the literature on what love 
is and its role in moral life is vast, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to add or adjudicate 
any of what has been said. Rather, I hope to simply start the discussion about allyship and love 
by trying to find an uncontroversial, constitutive feature of love.  
 It is not hard to imagine paradigmatic cases of love. We can imagine a parent who picks 
up weekend shifts in order to afford tutoring for his child so that they may be able to do well in 
school. Or we can imagine the wife who puts her game tickets up for sale so that they can help 
their Husband’s parents after a house fire. It seems to go hand and hand with our ideas of what 
love is that when you love someone, you will generally go above and beyond to try and help 
those that you love for their own sake.16 If we take a central component of love to be this deep 
concern for the well-being of the beloved because they are your beloved, often called the robust 
concern account of love, then it seems that, at least initially, we might be able to square allyship 
form self-interest with this morally justifiable attitude17.  
Allies from self-interest are motivated to advocate for those that are closest to them, those 
they care about. It is because of that caring relationship that the ally is motivated. For example, 
take a father who is coming to terms with his Trans daughter. The daughter tells her father that 
she feels very unsafe using the bathroom at school because she has to use the bathroom that 
matches her assigned gender in her school records rather than the bathroom that matches her true 
gender. The father loves his daughter and wants the best for her life because it is her life in 
particular. Because of his love for his daughter, the father writes the principal asking for his 
daughter to be able to use the restroom that makes her feel comfortable and safe. Luckily the 
                                                        
16 Velleman, in his paper “Love as a moral emotion,” draws some attention to this point by 
saying that there are those people we do love but cannot stand to be around or do anything for, 
like a distant family member. I find myself skeptical of such relations as being loving in a proper 
sense, but it is unnecessary for the paper to discuss those sorts of relations.  
17 I model this account of love similar to an account offered by Frankfurt in his chapter 
“necessity, volition, and love” in his book Necessity, Volition, and Love as well as his discussion 
of love in the chapter entitled “On Love, and Its Reasons” in The Reasons of Love. 
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principal makes an exception for his daughter and allows her to use the unisex bathroom in the 
school’s administrative office.  
It would seem that the father’s allyship seems to be a morally acceptable practice in this 
case. He was moved by his love and the concern for the beloved, his daughter, to help make her 
life the best it could be. The daughter no doubt benefited from her father’s advocacy on her 
behalf. She can use the restroom at school with at least some reduced concern about having to 
deal with her classmates when going to the restroom.   
But what if we reimagined the case to be that the daughter had not asked her father to 
speak with the principal, but rather had just confided in her father about the struggle that she has 
to deal with on a daily basis when she is at school. Her father is still motivated by his love and 
concern for her and so reaches out to the principal. In this example, the daughter still gets the 
benefit of being able to use the restroom free of harassment because her father, motivated by his 
love, advocated for her to be able to use the restroom in peace at school. The father’s action may 
seem to be equally as effective and so perhaps equally justifiable as an act of allyship, but it 
seems to be problematic in that the father failed to respect his daughter’s wish about whether or 
not she wanted him to speak on her behalf to the principal. The validity of the father’s actions 
becomes a little less clear then, but it still seems possible given our first example for someone to 
be a morally justifiable ally motivated by love. 
 
Love and morally justified allyship 
Allyship that is motivated by an attitude of love at first seems unproblematic and a 
plausibly good reason to keep with the practice of allyship. However, there seems to be issues 
that would make allyship from love a troublesome account to accept. One such reason is the 
singularity of the relationship between the lover and the beloved. My loving someone means that 
I have a special relationship to that person that makes their needs and concerns more pressing 
than others who may make a claim on my time and resources. This is because love is often 
stronger the closer the relation and the stronger the love the more likely I am to be drawn to the 
object of that love and their needs. As Frankfurt discusses in regard to Bernard Williams’ 
drowning wife, “The fact that he loves her entails that he takes her distress as a more powerful 
reason for going to her aid than for going to the aid of someone about whom he knows 
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nothing.”18 It may very well be the appropriate moral reaction for the husband to save his 
drowning wife without any thought to whether or not he should save her or the stranger. The 
concern, however, is that such favoritism seems counter to the overall goal of allyship.  
In the example of the father advocating for his daughter’s ability to use a bathroom and 
feel comfortable, he is motivated by his love and his concern for his daughter. Had the case been 
that it was simply a friend of his child who was Trans and uncomfortable using the restroom, or 
even a stranger that he did not know, it seems that the father would be less motivated to advocate 
on their behalf, if he would even advocate at all. While the father may be advocating for his 
Trans daughter, he is not advocating for Trans students in general who face oppressions that stem 
from a sexist, transphobic society, and he is not working to change those structures. Rather he is 
simply trying to solve a symptom of the systemic oppression that his daughter is facing because 
he wants her to be happy, not because the system is unjust. It seems then that an ally acting form 
love would not act on behalf of the interest of oppressed people in general for their own sakes, 
but rather just for those that the allies happened to care about.  
Another concern with grounding any moral justification for allyship in an attitude of love 
is that love is not always the best guide in doing what is best for a person. Often enough we find 
ourselves doing things for those we love that are not good for their overall well-being simply 
because we want them to be happy. We assume that our loving them makes our actions on their 
behalf a good thing. Again, it is not that such actions themselves are morally troublesome, even 
though they may be; it is rather that rooting a morally justified allyship practice in love might 
lead to allies doing things on behalf of oppressed people simply because they believe it to be 
what their loved ones who are oppressed want without checking with the beloved. This is what 
happened in our example where the father spoke to the principal without the permission and 
consent of his daughter. It may be that his daughter would still be allowed to use the restroom in 
the administrative office, but she now is the subject of unwanted attention by administrators that 
may only worsen her lived experiences at school due to the extra attention.  
It seems then that framing allyship as a moral practice rooted in love would fail to 
provide the necessary foundation to address the worries about allyship that already exist, most 
importantly re-centering. Thinking about love as an attitude that causes one to care about what 
                                                        
18 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 37. 
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happens to those that they love does not seem to necessarily entail that the lover while always act 
in a way that is consistent with the autonomy and rationality of their beloved. In fact, as the 
above example attempts to show, it is perfectly consistent to act from love on behalf of one’s 
beloved in a paternalistic manner.  
It is also troublesome that acting from love would only lead me to act to address the 
issues of a small amount of people. I would not be acting to change entire systems, nor would I 
care at all about anyone beyond those I love. Allyship, as a practice, seeks to establish the 
equality of all persons as a matter of fact in regard to sociopolitical power relations. Love, as an 
attitude, also seems to allow for the ability to favor some people over others due to matters of 
luck regarding one’s relation to another person. While this privilege is different than existing 
systemic privilege, any privilege is counter to the equality central to allyship.  
 
Allyship and Beneficence 
Let’s now sketch some examples of what we might typically consider beneficent actions 
with a social justice orientation. While walking around campus, I see a young woman being 
harassed that her shorts are too short especially since she is a larger woman and so she should not 
be wearing them. I interject to explain that he has no business telling her what to wear and that 
she has every right to wear whatever she wants regardless of what he thinks. Later on, as I am 
walking through the store, I hear an individual making comments to a gay couple about how it is 
inappropriate for them to be holding hands in the store. Again, I offer my assistance without 
being asked, but assume that my help is wanted. I start talking to the couple about mundane 
things to draw attention away from the comments. They smile and continue down the aisle with 
me. In these cases, I am acting out of general goodwill and concern for my fellow persons. I 
believe that I am doing something good by helping them. All of these examples appear prima 
facie to be motivated by doing good for someone else for that person’s sake. Allyship, it seems, 
appears to be a form of beneficence.  
 For another example, consider Jane, who works in an office where they have recently 
hired a new team member, Sue, who is in a wheelchair. Jane takes Sue out for lunch on her first 
day to a local restaurant as a way to welcome Sue to the office. Sue had never been to the 
restaurant, and Jane was excited because the eatery was one of her favorites. Once at the 
restaurant, Jane notices for the first time that the restaurant is not set up in a way that makes it 
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easily accessible for patrons with mobility issues. Jane, wanting to show that she cares about 
Sue, takes it upon herself to speak with the manager about how the restaurant ought to be better 
equipped for customers, like Sue, who have mobility impairments. Jane is concerned for Sue and 
hopes that by speaking to the manager, things might change so that Sue may feel more 
comfortable at the eatery in the future. It seems that Jane is acting as an ally for Sue and that 
Jane’s actions are acts of beneficence. Jane sincerely acts out of care for Sue, and Sue is in fact 
benefitted by Jane’s actions because, say, the restaurant does take steps toward a more universal 
design.   
 Given that Jane’s actions were beneficial to Sue because they helped change something 
to better accommodate Sue’s mobility impairments, and that Jane was acting out of concern for 
Sue Jane seems to be an ally given the general definition that comes from Briodo. We can further 
imagine that later that day in a staff meeting Jane made it a point to state that a PowerPoint is not 
the best form of presentation considering that another colleague, Alice, is visually impaired even 
though Alice herself made no comment or mention about the PowerPoint. Through Jane’s 
announcement about what is best for Alice, the office manager who had previously not thought 
anything about the PowerPoint sought to find better ways of dispensing information that was not 
visually dependent. Alice, just as was that case with Sue, now finds herself better off at work.  
In both of these examples, it seems that Jane has good intentions in trying to help both of 
her colleagues by making their environments easier for them to navigate. While Jane gives us 
good reason to think that allyship is a form of beneficence there may be reason to think that even 
if a person, attempting to act like an ally from beneficence may, in fact, fail to be an ally.  
We can reimagine the example of Jane speaking up for Alice in order to get the Office 
Manager to stop relying on PowerPoints because Alice has a visual impairment. It might still be 
the case that the Office Manager moves away from using PowerPoint presentations which is 
helpful to Alice. However, the manager may become overly suspicious of Alice, believing that if 
her impairment makes it hard to see a PowerPoint than she must be getting assistance from her 
colleagues to get some of her assignments completed. If this increased scrutiny on Alice turns up 
even the smallest infractions, ones that have nothing to do with her disability, she may very well 
find herself being reprimanded or terminated. In this case it would seem that Jane’s actions are 
not entirely beneficial, if they are at all. Indeed, even in the less dramatic imagining, where Alice 
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is still the subject of increased scrutiny, but such extra attention turns nothing up it seems that 
Alice is being harmed by the well-intentioned actions of Jane.  
Sadly, our beneficent acts go wrong more often than we would like. Just as with the 
reimagined case of Jane and Alice, Jane has all good intentions to help improve Alice’s work 
environment when she raises the concern in the meeting, yet Alice ends up losing her job. Of 
course, we live in a society were Alice may have legal redress to the actions taken by her 
supervisor. We might even wish that Alice had been aware enough to bring her supervisor’s 
actions to HR long before Alice lost her job. However, the fact is that Jane’s actions simply 
failed to be beneficial to Alice, no matter how good her intentions. Because of this it seems that 
we must say that cases of failed beneficence cannot serve as moral justifiers for allyship.  
  On the other hand, there are cases in which someone acts beneficently towards another, 
actually helps that person, but does so in at least partial hopes of advancing their own ends. 
Sometime the intent to advance themselves by being beneficent is a key motivating factor in 
acting. Other times someone may be consciously unaware of the fact that they are benefiting 
from their own beneficence as well.  
For example, we could think that Jane is mentioning the restaurants ill-layout in part to 
make her appear more sensitive about Sue’s mobility in order to head off the office gossip about 
her insensitivity. In this case Jane is benefiting Sue by raising the issue to the restaurant staff 
because they do work to move the set up towards a universal design. However, Jane was seeking 
to receive a certain emotional reaction/ evaluation of herself from Sue that would then help to 
repair her office image.   
Similarly, the critique of ally theatre falls into this category. Often times, according to 
many theorists, allies fail to engage in true allyship and, rather, perform ally theatre. The nice 
white guy is a perfect example of this sort of ulterior beneficence. Lori Patton and Stephanie 
Bondi discuss an all-to-common phenomenon where white faculty members were viewed as 
being anti-racist allies while not significantly engaging in actual ally work. In fact, the 
individuals that were interviewed admitted to failing to address the systemic racism that they 
came across in higher education but were reaping the social benefits of being seen as socially 
forward and educated. These faculty members where being beneficent to their students and 
coworkers by acknowledging the oppression that they faced. One participant that was 
interviewed by Patton and Bondi stated that he believed it to be beneficial that he used 
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“marginalized source such as The Journal of Negro Education.”19 Students and colleagues of 
these individuals received benefits from at least feeling that they had an ‘ally’ in their 
surroundings, but it is most definitely that case that these nice white men, no matter how 
unknowingly, were benefitted by their own actions.  
 Even when thinking of these examples when beneficence may go awry, there is a pull to 
think that allyship can be justified by being rooted in an attitude of beneficence.  After all, when 
someone acts from beneficence, as we have defined it, they are seeking to help those in need of 
help. However, even though beneficence is a moral virtue, there may still be good reasons to be 
hesitant about finding moral justification for allyship in beneficence.    
 
Why Effective Beneficence falls short 
 First, acts of beneficence appear to place debts of gratitude on the recipients of those acts. 
If I were to cook dinner every night for a friend who is tight on money, they should show 
appreciation or gratitude for doing so by at least thanking me or perhaps cooking dinner for me if 
my power goes out. One reason we may think that such debts of gratitude exist is that, when 
others do not show us gratitude for our beneficent actions towards them, they may simply have 
used us in disrespectful ways. 
 If we think of Jane’s action as an ally as being an act of beneficence, then it would seem 
correct that Sue is now under an obligation to be grateful to Jane even though Sue made no 
demand on Jane to speak for her mobility needs at the restaurant. Often, we are more than 
pleased to fulfill our duties of gratitude to others, but, as Adam Cureton argues, one of the 
potentially troubling features about owing gratitude is that by owing gratitude one becomes a 
moral unequal with their benefactor.20   
 Being differently abled, especially in a visually obvious way, already puts Sue at a 
societally unequal position due to overt and covert forms of ableism prevalent throughout 
society. Jane believes that she is performing a beneficent action that will help improve, at least in 
a very small way, the environment that Sue must navigate. If we think that Jane is acting out of 
beneficence, it seems that she is, on the one hand, trying to help Sue, but on the other, she is, 
                                                        
19 Patton and Bondi, “Nice White Men or Social Justice Ally,” 500. 
20 Adam Cureton, “Offensive Beneficence,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 
2, no.1 (2016): 74-90. 
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consciously or not, creating more inequality on top of what Sue already faces because her 
beneficent action will impose an extra duty on Jane.21 The problems of inequality are 
compounded for communities that often find themselves the subjects of apparently beneficent 
actions. As Cureton states, “current social circumstances and abilities make people who are 
differently abled more likely than others to receive optional beneficence and less likely than 
others to be in a position to give it.”22  In this way, people who are already vulnerable to societal 
inequality become even more unequal in comparison to able-bodied individuals by consistently 
being the subject of others’ beneficent actions and so owing far more debts of gratitude than 
others have toward them.  
 There are, of course, many ways in which people are unequal and, in some cases, that 
inequality is not a significant concern. My ability to play guitar is unequal to that of Eric 
Clapton, but such inequality is socially insignificant. However, the inequality that comes for 
debts of gratitude incurred by oppressed communities is a salient inequality because it not only 
adds to the already existent social inequality but also reinforces the perception of these 
communities as needy or politically weak, thus further encouraging the societal inequalities that 
allyship seeks to eliminate. If allyship is an act of beneficence, then allyship creates debts of 
gratitude on individuals belonging to the oppressed communities that those actions seek to help. 
In doing so, allyship is creating inequality while supposedly trying to end inequality.23 While it 
may very well be the case that Jane’s actions were, all things considered, good for Sue, Jane’s 
actions may be disrespectful because of the effects that her actions have on her and Sue’s social 
and moral standing with regard to each other and even with regard to the world. 
While the fact that beneficence can create unequal moral standing between persons is 
enough to raise our concerns about beneficence being the sole attitude to underlie allyship, it 
does give enough reason for hesitation. In addition, though, beneficence also raises two other 
                                                        
21 One might state that this thinking seems to imply that we ought not do beneficent things for 
people who already face societal inequality. I have yet to completely work out a response to such 
a concern.  
22 Adam Cureton, Offensive beneficence, 13 (online pagination)  
23 Perhaps allies ought to discharge debts of gratitude as a way of eliminating the inequalities 
arise from those debts. Discharging the debts would be consistent with the ally’s goal of pursuing 
equality. However, the concern that the debt is even created as well as the concern of the 
voluntariness of discharging the debt is still enough reason to want to conceptualize of allyship 
as predominantly something other than acts of beneficence.  
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concerns. The first is that beneficence seems to take a very individualized focus; by which I 
mean that when someone acts beneficently they are doing so with an individual or group directly 
in mind. To further explicate the point, when we think of typical acts of beneficence they are 
person centered, almost by definition. Beneficent actions have a subject to whom the benefit is 
intended. Jane is acting beneficently for Sue. I held the door open for the student behind me. Of 
course, there are more general targets of beneficence; for example, I donated clothing to the 
homeless shelter for the homeless of my city. Even in these kinds of examples, though, my act 
has a real and specific target that is, at least in theory, benefiting from my actions. While it is true 
that these points do not seem at all contradictory to what allyship appears to be, there is again at 
least some reason to take a second thought about the matter. 
The idea that beneficent actions require someone to benefit from the actions does not at 
first seem to be problematic for an account of allyship. Obviously, allyship has as a goal to 
improve the lives of those that are oppressed. However, Allyship that is focused solely on 
helping those in need of help misses part of the larger goal of allyship, which is to change the 
system and, so, thus making lives better for those who were oppressed by the system. Perhaps, in 
summary, one could simply say that allyship’s goal is to make the world such that the need for 
allyship would never come about. Simply focusing on remedying individual symptoms of a 
rotten system through acts of beneficence while creating valuable outcomes in the lived 
experiences of those who are oppressed still seems to fall short of an important part of allyship.  
The concerns so far raised regarding beneficence as a moral attitude that constitutes 
allyship have not offered definitive conclusions against the role that a beneficence. It is not 
entirely clear that we would want to strip a beneficent attitude from allyship. However, there is a 
troubling conclusion that comes from maintaining that beneficence is the sole attitude that 
underlies allyship. When we act beneficently towards someone, we are acting from a place of 
goodwill out of concern for someone by seeking to help them in some way. We are, essentially, 
preforming an act of charity, an act that we do not owe, for the person we are hoping to help. If 
we think of allyship as being a species of beneficence, then, it seems, that we are saying that 
allyship is, in some ways, simply an act of charity. Thinking of allyship as charity is problematic 
for many reasons. Some of these reasons have been mentioned above, debts of gratitude and 
unequal moral standing. Another reason that equating allyship with charity is problematic is that 
charity is an imperfect duty that is left up to the performer to decide when to act. Acts of charity 
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can also undermine the recipient’s rationality if the benefactor believes that they know better 
than the recipient what the recipient needs. 
Beneficence is a morally worthy attitude for one to hold in life, and it seems that 
beneficence, at first take, can explain what it is that an ally does. While I think that beneficence 
may indeed play a role in allyship I have sought to show in this section that there may be reasons 
not to conceptualize allyship as solely some species of beneficence. The issue at heart with the 
phenomenon of allyship re-centering is that allyship of that kind does not deconstruct the power 
relations that brought about the oppression that, in turn, brought about revolt and allyship. Acts 
of beneficence, in some ways, leave this unequal power relation intact, if not stronger than 
before. In addition to that concern, to think of allyship as an act of charity seems to 
mischaracterize exactly what allyship is supposed to be; an imperfect duty. And thinking of 
allyship as charity that is bestowed on those who need it can undermine the rational nature of 
oppressed persons if allies believe that they know what oppressed people need or simply act 
without listening to oppressed communities and people. For these reasons, I think it safe to 
conclude that while beneficence may have a role in allyship, allyship is not rooted in 
beneficence. 
 
Allyship and Respect 
 If the points raised in the previous sections are correct, there seem, then, to be good 
reasons to think that love and beneficence are not the central moral bases for allyship. Neither 
one can appropriate address the issue of re-centering and raise additional worries about what 
allyship might entail should we develop a conceptual framework around those attitudes. Perhaps 
we might start the search for allyship’s moral foundations again by trying to think about what are 
some actions that are paradigmatic of allyship. From the viewpoint of the dominant culture, 
allyship is thought of as taking a stance of educating oneself about others’ struggles and 
oppressions, properly acknowledging the oppression and struggle of oppressed communities, 
advocating for change on behalf of these communities, and attempting to change negative 
attitudes about these communities within the dominant culture. Allies are concerned with the 
wellbeing of those who face oppression in society at large, and they strive to correct the 
injustices that marginalized communities face. When thinking of what to expect from an ally of 
varying social movements, it is someone who genuinely cares about those they are advocating 
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and goes out of their way to learn about the culture and lived experiences of that group. Allies 
care about the mistreatment and lack of welfare that a group experiences as a result of 
oppression. Allies help construct safe spaces and communities for the oppressed as well as help 
to construct a narrative within the dominant culture about the struggles these communities face. 
This commitment to epistemic justice helps bring marginalized discourses into dominant 
discourses and creates spaces where this repressed knowledge can work to reframe the 
established epistemologies of the dominant culture.24  Allies also create platforms for and 
advocate on behalf of those marginalized as a matter of justice. More or less succinctly, allyship 
is based on a proper respect for another community that is oppressed. Allies, out of respect for 
these communities, work to improve society and deconstruct the systems that have oppressed 
that community.  All of these conceptions about what the role of an ally is stems from the belief 
that allies respect these communities in a certain way. Specifically, it seems, that these 
paradigmatic actions of allyship stem from a proper respect for oppressed people.  
 What it means to respect someone is in many ways very unclear and it is even more 
unclear as to why we ought to respect anyone beyond those we chose to respect. No doubt the 
overuse of the idea of respect has led to these kinds of confusion, and so something must be said 
as to what I mean here by a proper respect for people and what the respect might stem from. 
These initial remarks will be rather vague themselves but will hopefully give enough context to 
make this discussion worthwhile. First and foremost, it seems correct to say that all persons are 
equal as members of a moral community. This equality comes from the agency of each person in 
that each person has a capacity to set their own ends, acknowledge others in this community as 
also setting their own ends, and act as they determine to act in a certain kind of way. Respect 
then is the correct relational disposition to take towards other persons by acknowledging these 
same rational capacities in them. When we say that we respect someone it is to say that we see 
them first as moral equals and that we will work to develop these capacities that make them 
moral equals, we will allow others to exercise their capacities for end-setting, and that we should 
make sure to hold certain dispositions towards others as a matter of respect.25  
                                                        
24 I use epistemologies here in a way that I have encountered in feminist and critical theory work. 
I use it to mean the collective knowledge and ways of think within a specific culture. 
Epistemologies in this way are very influenced by society and are subjectively created.   
25 Hill 1980, 2000, and 1991 
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 Given this brief discussion of respect, we can think about the example of Jane and Sue 
going to the local eatery for lunch, we might be able to say that Jane is acting from a place of 
proper respect for Sue and not as a matter of beneficence. Jane speaks with the manager in the 
hopes of improving the environment for Sue similarly to what she hoped for when she acted 
from beneficence. But, more importantly, Jane is speaking with the manager because she 
properly respects Sue as being a person that deserves equal treatment, even in the ability to freely 
move, and not simply as something that needs help or charity to express their needs. This short 
example helps to begin to draw out what makes allyship rooted in respect importantly different 
from allyship rooted in beneficence.  
 The one of the concerns with allyship motivated primarily by beneficence or love 
mentioned earlier is whether or not one would perform acts of allyship whenever such actions 
are required seeing as allyship motivated by love appears to require some personal relation and 
beneficence are acts whose performance are left to the choice of the actor. When we think about 
say Jane speaking up for Sue and other differently-abled persons or the stranger who comforts 
and removes someone from the random racial tirade of some passerby on the street we think that 
such acts are owed as a matter of respect and that we should, if the circumstance do not put one 
into a certain level of distress, always engage in acts of allyship.    
Imagine seeing a Person of Color being verbally attacked by a group of White 
Supremacist. To claim in such cases that to assist the individual being attack is merely an 
imperfect duty of beneficence misses, I claim, the gravity of the situation. If we were to think 
that I could have, without the chance of great harm to myself, have interjected in the situation but 
chose simply to look the other way, then would I not seem to be a proper candidate of negative 
reactive attitudes? The individual being verbally assaulted is a person of equal moral standing, a 
person of incomparable worth, who is being unduly attacked. Such an attack is an attack on that 
person’s being. As a matter of properly respecting that person, we owe it to do all in our power 
to stop attacks on the person as a matter of respecting their worth.  
 Allyship though is not always concerned with blatant attacks on another’s dignity. Often 
these attacks come in very minute and obscure ways; through institutional policies that deem 
certain hair as “unprofessional” to policies that deny Trans persons the ability to change their sex 
on their birth certificates. While these kinds of policies and events seem to fall outside of our 
understanding of what it means to attack someone’s worth, such policies may in fact be even 
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more catastrophic in their effects on oppressed people than overt oppressive aggression. An ally 
motivated by love or beneficences may never see these policies effect someone’s life and so may 
not be moved to address them. An ally motivated by respect for persons seems more likely to see 
these policies as being inconsistent with that respect regardless of whether or not the ally sees the 
policy actually harming someone, and so seems more likely to address these larger systemic 
issues.  
Where Beneficence and love appear unable to capture the full breadth and nature of 
allyship and also fail to be able to offer an account that would address the issue of allies re-
centering their privilege in their ally work, respect seems to have been able to address these 
issues. Allyship rooted in respect would be able to motivate ally work on behalf of all individuals 
regardless or personal relation to the ally. Such allyship would also be able to make sense of the 
compulsory nature of allyship. In addition, Allyship based in respect would not place more 
burden in the form of gratitude on those whom are already oppressed. Respect, then, seems most 
appropriate as a moral foundation on which to frame what an ally is and what an ally ought to do.  
While it may be that a moral conception of allyship grounded in the kind of respect that 
we have so far explicated can account for many of the positive actions that we think of as 
paradigmatic of allyship such “positive” respect appears unable to completely address the central 
criticism that leaves allyship morally bankrupt. Positive respect is understood as respect that 
motivates someone to engage in actions for the sake of someone. As we discussed earlier 
respecting someone means understanding, acknowledging, and valuing the equal worth of that 
person. Allyship motivated by respect entails then that an ally would see those who are 
oppressed as equals, and, yet, even at this stage it seems that an ally can re-center their power.  
 An ally may respect those whom they are seeking too ally with and still manage to re-
center themselves and their privilege. A conception of allyship solely from positive respect can 
motivate an ally, in a seeming paradox, to preform acts that re-center the ally’s privilege and 
power. The ally who advocates for someone out of respect may in fact still disrespect the person 
they are seeking to advocate for by not allowing those who are oppressed to lead themselves, to 
control their narratives, and to decide how to protest their oppression. The fact that an ally could 
be acting out of a positive respect for oppressed people and still disrespect those communities is 
why even the last stage of Edward’s Allyship model is vulnerable to the critique raised against 
allyship in general. That being the case then we must either reformulate our conception of what 
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If we revisit the Jane and Sue example from the previous section, it is possible to say that 
Sue may not want or need Jane to speak to the management about better arranging the restaurant. 
When Jane does, in fact, speak with management without expressed consent from Sue, Jane is in 
some ways violating Sue’s dignity and autonomy. Generally, we would agree that Sue has the 
right, as a rational being, to decide what actions she takes and what actions should be taken on 
her behalf. Sue, simply put, is an agent in the world who has certain capacities that make her 
actions relevantly free in certain ways. As such then Jane, as a matter or respect must relate 
herself and her actions in certain ways to Sue. When Jane speaks on behalf of Sue without Sue’s 
approval, then Jane has used her privilege to act on behalf of Sue and yet also on Sue as if Sue is 
unable to advocate for herself. Given the very real possibility of these kinds of case, it would 
appear that a moral conception of allyship based in respect fails. However, there is good reason 
to think that our understanding of respect can offer an explanation as to why such actions are 
disrespectful in some way and how allies might be able to act form respect without re-centering 
their privilege.  
Adam Cureton, in “The Limiting Role of Respect for People with Disabilities,” parses the 
ways that one might properly respect an individual with a disability.26 Specifically, Cureton 
draws out the idea that respect calls for someone to become more involved in another’s life so to 
make it better, but that respect also gives us competing reasons to keep our distance from one 
another. This other face of respect, negative respect, seems to call for respecting others privacy, 
autonomy to act, and acknowledging their goals and prerogatives in such a way as to distance 
ourselves from each other. If being an ally is based on proper respect for marginalized and 
oppressed people, then it seems that there is a tension between the role of an ally based in 
positive respect and the role of an ally based in negative respect. Allyship that stems from 
positive respect seeks to incorporate the ally in the lives of marginalized communities in many 
ways while allyship stemming from negative respect requires that allies give privacy and 
                                                        




distance to these communities so that they may act on their own accord. So perhaps a better 
understanding of negative respect can help explain some of the discomforts felt because of Jane’s 
actions. 
 In the Sue and Jane example, there are at least a couple of ways to explain our uneasiness 
through the lens of negative respect. First, it could be that Sue had no intention of making 
mention of the poor physical layout at the restaurant. Perhaps Sue may have decided to downplay 
her disability as much as possible in work and social settings, and by trying to advocate on Sue’s 
behalf, Jane brought her disability front-and-center, and in doing so completely trumped her 
colleagues’ goals and prerogatives. Second, Jane might be making assumptions about what Sue 
can or cannot do or access (ease finding a seat in a restaurant, or Sue’s ability to speak up for 
herself). In doing so, Jane seems to devalue the agency of her colleagues because they are unable 
to act freely in either expressing or not expressing their protests or needs for assistance. 
 Another possible way that Jane is not acting in accord with negative respect is by not 
allowing Sue a chance to sort of “stand up for” herself. As I discussed in chapter two oppression 
has deep effects on individuals’ identities and their self-understanding. Systems of oppression 
work to reinforce the system in part by weaving into the societal dialogue that those whom are 
oppressed are oppressed because they deserve it in some way. This internalization of oppression 
can manifest in many ways, one such way is for those who are oppressed to take on an air of 
servility. Thomas Hill discusses some of the effects of this servile attitude and how it corrupts 
one’s ability to properly understand their own moral worth and so they see themselves as 
deserving of being oppressed and devalued as moral equals.  
Say that Sue is experiencing this sense of servility. As such she does not properly respect 
herself and so she will not speak up when a social circumstance is unfairly structured because 
she believes herself to be less worthy than able-bodied individuals. In such an example, it 
appears that Jane denies Sue the chance to respect herself through self-advocating because Jane 
told Sue’s narrative instead of creating a space encouraging Sue to share her own narrative. Or, it 
could even be that Sue does respect herself, but was still unable to speak up for her own worth 
before Jane did. In either case, it seems that Sue had her right to affirm her own beliefs and 
values regarding her disability denied by Jane’s actions that sought, out of respect, to advocate 
for Sue.  
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 Even when considering why our ally’s actions might be inappropriate, it is still possible 
to think about where Jane came from in her actions. Perhaps in the case where Sue does not 
properly respect herself, Jane might feel that her actions will both bring to the forefront of Sue’s 
and others’ minds that Sue is owed respect and so is owed reasonable accommodation.  Our ally 
is merely trying to respect her colleague’s worth as a human being, as something valuable in its 
self. Maybe even Jane is aware that by advocating in the restaurant that she is trumping Sue’s 
prerogatives, but Jane believes that ultimately, for future persons the greater good wins out. 
When considering these thoughts, one might be led to think that Jane did not stray far from 
correct allyship.   
 A moral conception of allyship rooted in respect where respect is understood as both a 
motivational force for positive action to do things for others and a negative motivational force 
for restraining that positive action, thus keeping it from running over the line of being 
disrespectful or re-centering of the privilege of the ally, seems able to both account for our 
general understanding of allyship while also answering the critique raised. Grounding allyship in 
the moral attitude of respect also allows for the accountability of allies to each other and to the 
communities that allies seek to work with.  
 
Conclusion 
 Chapters one and two have attempted to lay out the pragmatic framework of allyship as 
well as the troubling critique of allyship that calls allyship work into question as being effective 
and properly relating individuals with privilege to those who are oppressed. In this chapter I have 
examined possible moral attitudes, love, beneficence, and respect, that are popularly taken to 
align allyship and that seem to best fit with the pragmatic framework of allyship. With further 
analysis, though, it seems that there are reasons to think that love and beneficence are unable to 
ground allyship so that allyship may be able to weed out the practice of re-centering in addition 
to other entailments that might come with framing allyship as acts of love or beneficence. I have 
concluded that within the scope of my analysis that allyship rooted in positive respect is richer in 
its ability to explain the paradigmatic actions of allyship. In addition, a fuller understanding of 
respect understood negatively provides a necessary piece in understanding allyship that 
addresses the phenomenon of re-centering and thus providing a sound moral conception on 
which allyship may be reframed. It is worth clarifying, though, that I am not attempting to give a 
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theory that will adjudicate conflicting attitudes within allyship such as love, beneficence, or even 
between negative and positive respect. All of these attitudes are extremely important in a rich 
moral life and to begin to adjudicate between them will require a sound judgement and moral 
sensitivity depending on the circumstances. I am merely attempting to illustrate the necessary 
foundational role of negative respect as it relates to a moral conception of allyship.  
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CHAPTER 4: Allyship, Negative Respect, and Looking Forward 
 
Introduction 
 In chapter three I examined possible moral conceptions of allyship based on the moral 
attitudes that seem to accompany different stages of allyship. I presented arguments for why it 
seems that love and beneficence, contrary to our initial reactions, seem to be concerning moral 
attitudes on which to build a moral framework for allyship. It seems that respect, as I discussed 
earlier, would be able to serve as a proper foundation in that it can both address the pitfall of re-
centering in allyship and that respect can capture, in broad strokes, the general actions and ideas 
that are the core of allyship. In this final chapter, I want to begin by briefly summarizing the 
conceptual understanding of allyship I have so far attempted to sketch. After which I will 
examine cases and concerns in which we might be tempted to abandon the framework and to 
offer reasons why we would want to continue with the conception so far.   
 
Toward a Moral Conception of Allyship 
 Allies seek to create positive change in the world around them and for those who are 
oppressed through a plethora of actions. Specifically, allies are concerned with challenging and 
changing oppressive power structures and systems within society that bestow privilege on them 
while unduly robbing others of necessary resources and rights. I assumed from the start that 
allyship is at its core a moral practice however only empirical understandings and theories about 
allyship have grown in popularity. During this growth in popularity, the practice of allyship has 
found itself the subject of increasing scrutiny, especially from oppressed communities. While 
allies may have good intentions, they have notoriously engaged in a practice that is troubling and 
damning of the entire enterprise of allyship.  
 This practice is the phenomenon of re-centering. Re-centering, recall, involves such 
things as when an ally engages in ally work that emphasizes the allies understanding of 
oppression, what oppressed communities ought to do or how they ought to change in order not to 
be oppressed. It is basically when an ally believes that they themselves are more equipped to 
understand and to lead oppressed persons out of oppression. This practice is most troubling 
because it simply changes the face of oppression instead of actually overhauling the oppressive 
system. This practice morally bankrupts allyship because ally work which is by nature a moral 
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endeavor, i.e., allyship’s emphasis on recognizing the equality of all, is robbed of its moral 
significance by seeing oppressed communities as things to be acted upon instead of fully equal 
rational beings. Therefore, a moral conception of allyship is needed that can hold allies 
accountable for committing such morally speculative behavior while fully capturing the nature of 
allyship.  
 We understand that allyship is a set of attitudes that motivate someone of privilege to 
action addressing the systems that bestow that privilege and oppress others along with the actions 
that are produced by those attitudes. Love and beneficence are important moral attitudes and 
seem to be in line with the actions an ally might perform, and the way allies seem to relate to 
those they are attempting to assist, and yet there are many reasons to think that allyship should 
not solely be rooted in either beneficence or love. Overall, it seems that the first step in 
constructing an effective, moral framework of allyship must be to understand allyship as being 
rooted in respect. This respect must be both a positive respect that calls us to action in order to 
protect the rational value of persons as well as a negative respect that calls us to distance 
ourselves in order to respect the rational value of persons. It is this understanding of respect that 
makes sense of the need for allies to above all other things respect the self-determination of 
oppressed communities.  
 In working towards a moral conception of allyship, allies must properly understand what 
it means to allow oppressed communities to self-determine. Allies should provide resources to 
these communities so that they can organize the way that they need to advocate for their rights. 
Allies should provide themselves as the bodies necessary to help get the ground work done. 
Allies should follow the direction of those who are oppressed and follow through with how 
community leaders determine to protest. Respecting the rational powers of oppressed people 
means acknowledging that they are capable of determining their own avenues of action, and if 
allies are truly committed to helping these communities, then allies ought to follow. This is not 
meant to be a blanket statement that allies should blindly follow whatever action oppressed 
communities might decide to engage in. It does mean recognizing that allies have systemic 
power and so may be able to provide some input but recognize that they are at an epistemic 
disadvantage in understanding what exactly it means to be oppressed in certain ways.  
 One might claim that there may be legitimate times in which an ally should take on 
leadership on behalf of oppressed communities. Let us imagine that a straight ally may be able to 
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detail an extensive plan that would achieve every possible queer movement goal imaginable, but 
it would require that the queer leaders and community fall behind this straight ally. Would it not 
be in the best interest of the queer community to allow and even encourage such straight 
leadership if it meant achieving all of the community’s goals? 
 This example seems comparable to the case of the Fanon’s slaves who were merely freed 
by the dictate of the government without any uprising. At first, such happenings appear 
desirable, wished for even, in that to those who are the oppressors there is no loss of money or 
blood or resource and peace is kept, yet for those who are oppressed nothing seems to change 
truly. The system that oppressed them before still acts upon them as an object. If the system truly 
acknowledges the equality of the oppressed, then the system would acknowledge that the 
oppressed know best how the system operates to keep them oppressed and about how to make 
them equal. And such acting upon does not properly relate the ally to the oppressed communities 
that they are seeking to assist. No matter how much good an ally may believe themselves to be 
doing, freedom from oppression must come at the work and leadership of the oppressed, or it 
seems merely a token awarded by the oppressor.27  
Allyship must put self-determination as a matter of proper moral respect front and center. 
The benefit of such a framework, besides the value it may hold if it is in line with the moral law, 
is that it provides a sense of accountability and pushback against possible condescending or 
pitying attitudes that allies may have. Such a framework would also entail that allyship is a moral 




                                                        
27 The suggestions for a moral conception I have offered in this thesis rest on some major 
assumptions about the sort of society that we live in. First, I assume that this conception on 
allyship rooted in respect emphasizing self-determination can only truly work in a society in 
which those who are oppressed have some semblance of access to resources and organizational 
ability. Counter cases can be imagined or drudged up from history in which certain oppressed 
peoples are beyond the ability to self-determine and fight their own oppression and must rely 
solely on the work of the dominant population to bring about just change in favor of those who 
are oppressed. These cases and what they would require of allyship are worth examining but are 
beyond what this project seeks to explore or explain. I dare say that often enough in modern, 
Western societies these recommendations for effective, moral allyship can capture the scenarios 




 Every proposal must be cautious in what it proposes for action and equally cautious of 
objections that might be raised against it. Thinking of allyship as rooted in respect where that 
respect requires allies to first and foremost encourage self-determination of those who are 
oppressed is not above conscientious objections.  
 
Requiring too much 
 One may be concerned that having a moral duty to be an ally might place a great burden 
on people and that such a duty would be impossible to fulfill. Such a duty would require many 
tasks including individuals with privilege educating themselves on the issues facing oppressed 
communities so that they can fulfill their moral duty properly. It would require an unyielding 
vigilance in everything from common day conversations with family and friends to the highest 
levels of policymaking. Even with all that could possibly be required of someone if we were to 
think of allyship as a moral duty, the only response that seems fitting to the worry about such a 
duty requiring too much is to say that it pales in comparison to the hell that oppressed persons 
have to exist in due to unequal power systems and that no price can even counterbalance what is 
owed someone as a matter of respecting their dignity.   
 
Aloof Allyship 
One key objection to what has been presented is that such a conception appears to make 
allyship a cold and distant practice that may, in fact, discourage allies from actively engaging 
with oppressed people to help them in certain situations. Some people may even feel that allyship 
motivated by beneficence or love is more important because it shows that allies see and 
acknowledge the struggle of oppressed people by helping them in certain situations. The question 
of whether to act beneficently or to respect another’s autonomy at first appears to be a tough 
question. However, allyship motivated primarily by respect may not be as aloof as first thought. 
Thomas Hill in his chapter entitled “The Importance of Autonomy” discusses an understanding 
of autonomy where autonomy is seen not as opposing compassion or beneficent but seen as 
enriching the acts of compassion and beneficence. When the actor recognizes the receiver’s 
autonomy, and so the moral importance and equality of the receiver the actor’s beneficence or 
compassion are not given at the actor’s wishes but rather at the request of the receiver. 
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Respecting others in their ability to be self-determinant means that I would not assume to know 
when someone needs help and so would not interject with assistant without being asked but that 
does not mean that I would not assist at all. If anything, my respect for someone would make me 
more aware of their needs and more responsive to their calls for assistance. One can both respect 
the autonomous nature of others and still be compassionate, if not more compassionate.  
 
Permission from one or from all 
 In the discussion of the Sue and Jane case, I mention that Jane seems to act against Sue’s 
interest by not receiving some sort of permission to speak for Sue. It would seem impossible for 
any person to engage in ally work if it were the case that they always need permission to act. 
This concern while worth examining may be ill-framed. One point of this project is to emphasize 
that allyship ought to be targeting policies, rules, and beliefs that codify oppression and not 
directly focused on those who are oppressed. So, when an ally is seeking to call out say a 
restaurant for not being accessible to all people, then the ally should do so from an objective sort 
of standpoint rather than as the spokesperson for any one individual. If any ally is seeking to 
advocate for some person directly, then they ought to have that person’s permission to speak for 
them as they should when speaking for anyone any other time.   
 If allies are supposed to speak against oppressive policy etc. from a sort of objective 
standpoint, then that assumes that the oppressed communities have some unified standpoint to 
advocate from. No oppressed group has one unified vision for how to fight their oppression and 
what issues they want to address and in what order, so it seems that if allies are to follow the lead 
of these communities in advocating against oppressive policies, then that allyship comes to a 
grinding halt.  
 While I reject the idea that there is some static answer to this concern I think there are 
features of this view that might help lay the groundwork towards resolving this larger issue. 
Allies engaging in allyship rooted in respect would constantly be listening to the leaders of social 
justice movements and their proposals instead of trying to lead themselves. In listening and 
taking a back-seat, allies would be able to gather knowledge about a variety of issues that 
oppressed populations face. While there may be debate say around how to protest police violence 
against People of Color, it is beyond doubt that police violence is an issue. In this way, allies can 
listen for a harmonizing around issues and then address them. Allies will mess up, but allies who 
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understand that their actions must be rooted in respect will keep their ears open to critique from 
oppressed communities because the allies recognize that most importantly these communities 
have the right to determine how we are to advocate on their behalf.  
 Allies then would have some education on these issues from listening to those who are 
actually experiencing them. From there, in theory, allies would then be able to speak on these 
issues from an objective point of view. Allies should though always acknowledge that are merely 
echoing the voices of those who are oppressed. Allies do not own the narrative of those who are 
oppressed.  
 
Allyship and Severe Cognitive Disabilities 
 The last objection that I take up here is focused on the outcomes that follow from basing 
allyship in respect where respect is relational to the rational agential powers of persons. 
Individuals who are born with severe and profound cognitive disabilities have always been 
oppressed and cast down in society. People with such disabilities are extremely vulnerable and 
are in extreme need of individuals to advocate on their behalf to protect them from harm. Yet, a 
conception of allyship where allyship is rooted in recognizing the inherent value of persons via 
their rational agency seems unable to account for how to ally for individuals with cognitive 
disabilities. One may then be tempted to say that this conception of allyship as rooted in respect 
for the rationality of persons must be rejected. 
  Such an objection should not be taken lightly. It seems correct to conclude that the 
conception of allyship I have so forth supported would entail that one could not be an ally to 
individuals with severe cognitive disabilities because they are unable to be rational agents in the 
ways that ground respect and so allyship. Initially, I also think that it is not incorrect to say that 
we, strictly speaking, cannot be allies with severely cognitively disabled individuals. Someone 
who is severely cognitively disabled one is unable to set and pursue ends in any way. We can 
advocate on their behalf and represent what we believe to be in their best interest, but we cannot 
build movements of solidarity with them.   
 This is not to say that individuals of such cognitive functioning are not deserving of 
moral awareness and can be treated in ways that are inhumane. Society, as a matter of justice, 
say, must address the issues that face people with severe cognitive disabilities. Perhaps there are 
ways in which we owe respect to individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, and maybe that 
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respect is not different from the respect that is owed to rational agents. These are concerns and 
questions that must be addressed and they are deserving of their own projects. These remarks are 




 I began this thesis by saying that our society sits at a crossroads where we must either 
continue to bend the moral arc towards justice or face the turning back of all the progress that has 
been made so far. Now more than ever, a moral revival is needed. A small part of this revival is 
the work that allies do in solidarity with oppressed communities. Allyship, however, has found 
itself the center of many critiques that seem to leave the practice itself morally bankrupt. In this 
thesis I have attempted to propose a possible step towards a reframing of allyship that can 
address one of these critiques.  
 In the first chapter I laid out Keith Edward’s Model for Social Justice Allyship as an 
example for how allyship is often framed and discussed. After which I proposed possible moral 
attitudes that may play motivating roles in allyship. Chapter two takes up the issue of re-
centering by surveying the literature on how this practice takes place in allyship. The goal of 
chapter two was to clarify exactly what it meant for an ally to re-center their privilege and then to 
offer an argument for why such a phenomenon is problematic to allyship. Chapter three has the 
crux of the thesis. I sought to first explain why allyship motivated by either beneficence or love 
would be problematic and unable to address the issue of re-centering. I attempted to refrain from 
wholly denouncing any role for these attitudes in allyship but concluded that whatever role they 
might play it is not the most central. Ultimately it appeared that only respect could capture both 
our paradigmatic understanding of what allyship was as well as providing a framework that 
would address the issue of re-centering. Chapter three concludes with a discussion of how the 
respect that motivates allyship is best understood as being both a positive respect and a negative 
respect.  The final chapter presents a brief and hopefully clearer picture about allyship rooted in 
respect. After which I took up possible concerns to this proposed conception of allyship.    
In the end I must state that give all of this discussion being an ally is a complex role, and 
it is something that one cannot easily navigate. For the individuals who live lives of oppression 
and marginalization, allies are invaluable to reforming systems and cultures, but these allies are 
interacting with peoples’ lives and cultures, and they are complex. Some individuals live their 
lives proudly, educating and fighting at every turn, while some choose to hide. It is this diversity 
that makes allyship difficult to navigate. Allies seek to respect those they are trying to help and 
doing so requires both positive respect and negative respect. Being an ally requires appreciating 
those who society typically doesn’t, sharing their stories, and creating spaces for communication. 
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Being an ally also requires not intruding on those marginalized individuals who may not want to 
speak about their lived experience, it also involves not intruding on these individuals’ 
prerogatives, or violating their privacy. Given all of this, though, surely, we can be united in the 
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